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The present paper articulates a model in which ingroup and outgroup norms inform ‘rational’
decision-making (cost-benefit analysis) for conflict behaviors. Norms influence perceptions of
the consequences of the behavior, and individuals may thus strategically conform to or violate
norms in order to acquire benefits and avoid costs. Two studies demonstrate these processes in
the context of conflict in Québec. In the first study, Anglophones’ perceptions of Francophone
and Anglophone norms for pro-English behaviors predicted evaluations of the benefits and
costs of the behaviors, and these cost-benefit evaluations in turn mediated the norm-intention
links for both group norms. In the second study, a manipulated focus on supportive versus
hostile ingroup and outgroup norms also predicted cost-benefit evaluations, which mediated
the norm-intention relationships. The studies support a model of strategic conflict choices in
which group norms inform, rather than suppress, rational expectancy-value processes.
Implications for theories of decision-making and normative influence are discussed.
keywords cost-benefit analyses, expectancy-value processes, group processes,
intergroup conflict, norms, rational choice
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WHEN individuals identify as group members
rather than as unique individuals, they are
motivated to engage in pro-group action and 
to conform to ingroup norms (Tajfel & Turner,
1979; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989). The
relationship between pro-group conflict choices,
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such as decisions to engage in collective action,
and individuals’ evaluations of the costs and
benefits of these actions for themselves person-
ally has been the subject of much debate. Many
theorists have argued that individual-level
incentives are a primary motivation for partici-
pation in collective action (e.g. Olson, 1968).
Recent research however suggests that activists’
conflict choices may be predicted by group-
level factors independent of individual-level
costs and benefits (e.g. Kelly, 1993; Simon et al.,
1998). In particular, intergroup research has
repeatedly demonstrated non-instrumental
conformity to ingroup norms, based on self-
stereotyping and esteem-enhancement pro-
cesses (see e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996). 
It is argued here that in the context of 
intergroup conflict, group norms may also
influence decision-making because they define
the means to acquire benefits and to avoid
costs. A model of agentic normative influence is
presented which predicts cost-benefit evalu-
ations for conflict choices from group norms.
In this model, cost-benefit evaluations are
proposed to mediate the relationship between
group norms and individuals’ behavioral
intentions. If group norms and cost-benefit
perceptions are evaluated as independent
predictors of pro-group choices, it is proposed,
the role of group norms is underestimated
because cost-benefit perceptions may them-
selves be predicted by norms. Mediational
analyses will then reveal that for conflict
behaviors cost-benefit analyses play a role in
individuals’ strategic reactions to group norms.
We argue that not only ingroup norms, but also
outgroup norms, may be implicated in this
‘rational’ normative influence. Thus, the
present paper attempts to address two still-
contested theoretical positions: that cost-
benefit calculations may be normative; and
that outgroup norms may be influential in
intergroup decision-making. 
Norms in decision-making
Classic research in conformity confirms the
strong impact of norms on individuals’
behavior, not only in cases of high judgmental
uncertainty (Sherif, 1936), but even when
conformity means ignoring strong perceptual
cues (Asch, 1956), or performing ostensibly
life-threatening actions (Milgram, 1974). Norms
at the individual, interpersonal, and intergroup
levels have been argued to influence decision-
making. Needs to be authentic, or to affirm
moral commitments, are thought to motivate
individuals to act out personal or moral norms
(Gorsuch & Ortberg, 1983; in politics, Gecas,
2000). Individuals’ need for approval from
significant others motivates conformity to inter-
personal norms (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975; in political behavior, Klandermans,
1984). At the group level, referent group norms are
thought to define individuals’ behavioral reper-
toires as a function of salient identities, influ-
encing decision-making via self-stereotyping
processes (Terry & Hogg, 1996; in politics,
Kelly, 1993; Simon et al., 1998).
Psychological research has tended to study
conformity to group norms in the context of
destructive (e.g. Milgram, 1965), incorrect (e.g.
Asch, 1956) or arbitrary (e.g. Sherif, 1936)
behaviors (Turner et al., 1989; see also Kelly,
1993; Simon et al., 1998). Perhaps for this
reason, conformity is often presented as a
process that overrides rationality, causing indi-
viduals to engage in personally costly actions in
the service of authenticity, or interpersonal or
group affiliation. However, group norms have
also been shown to motivate deliberative pro-
cesses (e.g. Abrams, 1994; Mackie, Gastardo-
Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Mackie & Queller,
2000; Moscovici, 1985): when the behavior is
ingroup normative, individuals may systemati-
cally assess, rather than automatically endorse,
the consequences of the actions. Similarly,
decision-making research demonstrates that
beliefs about the costs and benefits of behaviors
may be correlated with perceived norms, rather
than independent of them (e.g. Vallerand,
Deshaies, Cuerrier, Pelletier, & Mongeau, 1992;
see Liska, 1984; Miniard & Cohen, 1981). Inter-
active and mediational models of normative
influence and cost-benefit evaluations are not
typically assessed, however, because dominant
decision-making models for individual decision-
making (Ajzen, 1991), intergroup decisions
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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(Turner et al., 1989), and social movement
participation (Klandermans, 1984) propose
independent paths.
Indeed, conformity to ingroup norms may
be motivating to individuals for many reasons
articulated in previous theories that are inde-
pendent of cost-benefit evaluations of the
behavior. For example, ingroup norms may
motivate conformity through self-stereotyp-
ing, as in referent informational influence (Terry
& Hogg, 1996); through a need for approval
from significant others, as in the theory of
planned behavior’s subjective normative influ-
ence (Ajzen, 1986); or through the moral
imperative created by internalized personal or
moral norms (Gecas, 2000). In these processes,
performing the behavior intrinsically satisfies
the motivation. In intergroup conflict,
however, an additional process must surely
also operate: conformity to ingroup norms
coordinates group members to advance
ingroup interest in the ongoing interaction.
Thus performing the ingroup normative
behavior generates additional benefits for the
group and thus the individual group member,
whereas violation of ingroup norms generates
additional costs for the group and thus the
individual members of the group (Abrams,
1994; Turner et al., 1989).
In intergroup contexts, individuals may
perform expectancy-value calculations (see
Feather, 1982) at a group level of analysis as
well as an individual analysis, estimating the
likelihood (expectancy) and importance
(value) of the costs and benefits that will accrue
to the group if particular behaviors are per-
formed (see Louis & Taylor, 2002; Louis, Taylor,
& Neil, 2005; Turner et al., 1989). The present
research, however, focuses on the derivation of
individual-level cost-benefit analyses from
group norms, proposing that in conflict choices
group norms contribute to the definition of
individuals’ self-interest, rather than overriding
it or operating in parallel. Testing a model of
agentic normative influence in which group norms
predict individuals’ cost-benefit analyses and
these analyses, in turn, significantly mediate the
norm-intention relationship, is the first goal of
the present research.
The relevance of outgroup norms?
Outgroups, that is groups to which individual
actors do not belong, or with whom individuals
do not identify, do not generally trigger needs
for approval, for affirmation, or understanding
(Turner et al., 1989). Outgroup norms have
been observed to influence behavior only when
backed by rewards and punishments, and com-
pliance with coercive outgroup normative influ-
ence is limited to outgroups with both power
and surveillance ability (see e.g. Reicher &
Levine, 1994). In the absence of coercive sur-
veillance, then, outgroup norms are theoreti-
cally irrelevant to individuals’ decision-making.
For example, safe sex behavior may be guided
by perceptions of what is appropriate for indi-
viduals’ peer groups, or what significant others
want, or what students personally believe to be
morally appropriate; knowing that an outgroup
(e.g. the Roman Catholic Church) frowns on
the use of condoms may simply have no impact
(see e.g. Mackie et al., 1992; Terry & Hogg,
1996). 
For intergroup behavior, in contrast, it is
argued here that outgroup norms should influ-
ence decision-making. Coercive normative influ-
ence is relevant to many intergroup decisions,
particularly for low power groups who may be
exposed to surveillance and the threat of
reprisals if the status hierarchy is challenged.
However, even without surveillance abilities to
create coercion outgroups may exert agentic
normative influence, because outgroup reactions
themselves constitute important consequences
or targets of action in intergroup conflict. In
conflict decisions, individuals may strategically
conform to or violate outgroup norms because
this conformity or violation is seen as helpful to
the group, with implications for the individual
group member.
Consistent with this argument, the expected
behavior of outgroup members has been shown
to influence intergroup behavior in many
contexts. For example, anticipated discrimi-
nation on the part of the outgroup may
produce retaliatory discrimination from equal
or high power groups (e.g. Blanz, Mummendey,
& Otten, 1995), and egalitarian or appeasement
Louis et al. norms and rational conflict
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behaviors from low power groups (e.g. Ng,
1982). Anticipated outgroup behavior defines
the consequences of inaction: if the ingroup
does not act, the outgroup has the initiative,
which is an essential strategic consideration
(see e.g. L. Gaertner & Insko, 2000). For
example, escalating violence in field studies has
been associated with the perception of intransi-
gent outgroup determination to maintain the
status quo in Israel (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998)
and in Ireland (Cairns & Darby, 1998). At the
most serious level, belief in the threatening
intentions of the outgroup has been observed
to be a critical process in the escalation of
intergroup violence, including riots (Drury &
Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984) and genocide
(Staub, 2001). Anticipated or past outgroup
behavior, in short, motivates behavior to change
or defend against outgroup actions. Impor-
tantly, because attributions regarding intention
moderate the link between outgroup past
behavior and inferences for future behavior,
perceptions of outgroup norms are critical in
order for outgroup behavior to motivate
ingroup action. If the outgroup behavior is
outgroup normative, it may be perceived as
intentional and likely to be repeated (see
Hunter, Stringer, & Watson, 1991). Thus, a
terrorist act attributed to the situation (‘War
inevitably produces atrocities’) or seen as
outgroup antinormative (‘Most guerrillas abhor
terrorism’) may have a far different effect in
defining the consequences of inaction than a
behavior seen as outgroup normative (‘These
guerillas endorse terrorism’).
Ingroup members respond to the anticipated
behavior of the outgroup if ingroup members
do nothing, but they also react to the anticipated
responses of the outgroup to their own action.
That is, an analysis of intergroup decision-
making must model the effects of ingroup and
outgroup norms on evaluations of the conse-
quences of conflict choices, from inaction to
conciliatory or confrontational action (see also,
Louis & Taylor, 2002; Louis et al., 2005). For
example, if the outgroup is known to oppose
sit-ins but tolerate peaceful demonstrations, at
least two effects of that knowledge might be
expected. Strategic conformity to the outgroup
norm—by demonstrating peacefully, in the
current example—might be seen to benefit the
group because it will elicit positive reactions
from the outgroup: perceived normative simi-
larity might (1) reduce symbolic threat and
therefore defensive behavior (Rokeach, 1960;
see also De Ridder & Tripathi, 1992); (2) make
salient a shared superordinate identity (see
S. L. Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, &
Rust, 1993) that delegitimizes the subgroups’
horizontal conflict behavior; and/or (3) signal
willingness to cooperate for mutual gain, trig-
gering reciprocity dynamics (Osgood, 1962)
and reducing ‘realistic’ conflict (Sherif, 1966).
Alternatively, strategic violation of outgroup
norms—engaging in a sit-in—may be seen as
beneficial if the action increases the costs of
maintaining an unfavorable status quo for the
advantaged group, motivating attention or con-
cessions (Dalton, 1988; Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1975).
For example, some research in political science
has suggested that violent riots may be particu-
larly effective in attracting ameliorative govern-
ment funding (Piven & Cloward, 1977),
although others have challenged this analysis
(see e.g. Burstein & Freudenberg, 1978). These
empirical results of intergroup conflict research
suggest that a theoretical model of conflict
decisions should do more than consider group
processes of normative influence and cost-
benefit analyses independently. The model
should include the normative aspects of instru-
mental decision-making, and the instrumental
aspects of normative influence. If group
members react dynamically to anticipated
behaviors of the outgroup, explicitly modeling
the effects of ingroup and outgroup norms on
actors’ cost-benefit calculations will be useful in
understanding and predicting actions in
conflict.
Agentic normative influence
Group norms exert agentic influence, we
propose, when they define the consequences of
intergroup behaviors: the means by which
groups achieve benefits or avoid costs. Group
norms are understood as strategic, influencing
active decision-makers as they choose among
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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intergroup behaviors which vary in their
consequences for self and group. Agentic norma-
tive influence may be contrasted with other
commonly studied normative influence pro-
cesses on three dimensions: the level of analysis,
the degree of deliberation, and the motivation
for conformity.
In conflict, agentic norms are measured at
the group level of analysis. This is similar to
referent group norms (e.g. Terry & Hogg,
1996), but in contrast to the individual level
tapped with measures of significant others’
interpersonal norms (e.g. Ajzen, 1991) or
personal moral norms (e.g. Gecas, 2000).
Group conflict is likely to make social identities
contextually salient, so that group-level vari-
ables play a primary role in decision-making
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1989).
Whereas in social identity models ingroup
sources alone exert referent group influence,
however, we propose here that outgroup as well
as ingroup norms can exert agentic influence.
Agentic influence for conflict choices
operates via deliberative cost-benefit analyses
(expectancy-value processes). This is similar to
the ‘social incentives’ of the Klandermans
(1984) social movement model, but in contrast
to self-stereotyping or internalized self-affirma-
tion in the referent informational influence
model (Terry & Hogg, 1996). The agentic
model seeks to integrate decision-making
theories of rational choice and of intergroup
social influence by hypothesizing that one
process by which groups exert influence in
conflict is by shaping members’ instrumental
perceptions of the costs and benefits of
behavior (see also Louis et al., 2005).
Finally, agentic norms are injunctive, not
descriptive; they are prescriptive, not behav-
ioral (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991).
Agentic norms, like subjective norms (e.g.
Ajzen, 1991), tap expected source approval or
disapproval, in contrast to norms that tap what
the source will do themselves, like referent
group norms. Referent informational influence
suggests that if union members perceive a
descriptive norm that strikes are what proto-
typical union members do in conflict situations,
the union members will be more likely to strike.
They will not be influenced by the outgroup
referent norm—the perception of whether or
not managers strike. In agentic normative influ-
ence, it is expected that union members will be
responsive to managers’ (as well as unions’)
injunctive norms for striking, because tactics in
unfolding conflict interactions must be evalu-
ated with an eye to the perceptions of the
conflict partner/opponent. It is both intuitively
compelling and (as discussed above) consistent
with past research to argue that union
members’ perception that managers (as well as
the union) think the union ought or ought not
to strike will change the perceived benefits and
costs of striking, and thus drive behavior.
Empirically, the agentic normative influence
model may improve the power of models of
decision-making in conflict by drawing atten-
tion to relevant outgroup norms (which could
be overlooked in predictive models that assume
that outgroups are irrelevant). But the primary
goal of the present paper is to model the medi-
ating process whereby ingroup and outgroup
injunctive norms influence behavior via cost-
benefit perceptions explicitly. If this mediation
occurs and models such as the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) or the selective
incentives model (Klandermans, 1984) are
applied to conflict choices, the effect will be to
underrate the normative influence that is rep-
resented in the decision-making model. This is
because the instrumental cost-benefit analyses
for the behavior and behavioral attitudes will
be understood as ‘independent’ predictors,
whereas if agentic normative influence is occur-
ring, cost-benefit analyses mediate indirect
normative influence (see also, Liska, 1984;
Miniard & Cohen, 1981). If agentic processes
occur and typical intergroup conflict models
are applied, measuring norms and behavior but
not cost-benefit perceptions for the actor, the
effect is to overlook the extent of ‘rational’
decision-making and the mediating role that
can be played by cost-benefit perceptions. Thus,
assessing agentic influence processes may allow
researchers to study the interplay of rational
decision-making and group norms—a con-
tentious and important topic, both socially and
theoretically. In the present paper, two studies
Louis et al. norms and rational conflict
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analyze agentic influence processes in the
context of English–French relations in Québec.
Study 1
The population of Québec is predominantly
Francophone, and coexists uneasily in federa-
tion with 12 predominantly Anglophone
provinces and territories. Since the 1960s,
Francophone rights have become a dominant
political issue within Québec and a ‘sovereign-
tist’ movement has championed the political
independence of Québec (see e.g. Linteau,
Durocher, Robert, & Ricard, 1991). The sover-
eigntist movement draws its support largely
from Francophone Québecers and is opposed
by a federalist movement supported by a
majority of Anglophone Québecers as well as a
minority of Francophones (e.g. Maclure, 2000).
In the first study, young Anglophone partici-
pants’ intentions to use English in consumer
contexts, and their cost-benefit evaluations of
these behaviors, were assessed as a function of
Anglophone and Francophone norms. Young
Anglophone Québecers speak French relatively
fluently, and provincial legislation mandates that
French should be the language of commerce
and work in Québec. Accordingly, using English
in consumer contexts is not merely a matter of
necessity or convenience: it is also a controver-
sial intergroup behavior (see Chevrier, 1997;
O’Malley & Bowman, 2001). In the present
study, we hypothesized in accordance with the
social identity approach that ingroup norms
would be associated with (1) higher intentions
to engage in the behaviors and (2) more favor-
able cost-benefit evaluations of the conse-
quences of the behavior for the actor. In line
with past research concerning the dynamic
impact of anticipated outgroup reactions,
outgroup norms for conflict behaviors were also
expected to be associated (3) with intentions
and (4) with cost-benefit evaluations. Finally, in
accordance with the agentic influence model,
(5) cost-benefit evaluations were predicted to
mediate the relationship between norms and
intentions, demonstrating a process by which
decision-making at the individual level may be
rationally informed by distal group-level factors.
Method
Participants Participants were required to
self-identify as Anglophone Québecers, and to
be born in Québec or to have lived in the
province for at least 10 years. Seventeen of the
224 recruited were excluded on these grounds;
of the remaining sample (N = 207), women
were slightly in the majority (n = 118, 57%) and
participants were predominantly federalist (n =
172, 83%), with minorities who were neutral (n
= 23, 11%), undecided (n = 10, 5%), or sover-
eigntist (n = 1, 1%).
Procedure Participants were recruited from
two English-language universities in Montréal,
Canada for a study on Anglophone Québecers’
responses to the language situation in Québec.
Those who were eligible to complete the
20-minute study were given consent forms,
tickets for two lotteries of C$100 (which were
awarded at the completion of the recruiting),
and questionnaire booklets. After completing
the questionnaire, participants were thanked
and debriefed verbally and in writing.
Materials
Introduction Under the title ‘psychology ques-
tionnaire’ participants read: ‘In the Province of
Québec, ethnicity strongly influences behavior
in everyday life. Language tensions between
Anglophones and Francophones provoke,
among different ethnic groups, differing
reactions. For example, Francophone Québe-
cers might respond to the situation by calling
for more dialogue, or by involving themselves
in language protection groups. A wide variety of
reactions are also available to Anglophone
Québecers. We have designed this question-
naire to determine how you yourself will act in
response to the language situation in Québec’.
Demographics An initial demographics section
of the questionnaire included written reitera-
tions of the screening questions, questions
regarding political affiliation, and French-
language skills. As expected, all participants
indicated that they could both understand and
speak French, although two participants indi-
cated they could read but not write in French.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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Social identification Identification as Anglo-
phones was assessed with a scale adapted from
Porter (1995). Three items measured import-
ance of the Anglophone identity, commitment
to expressing the identity, and perception of
community on 11-point scales from 0 (‘Not at
all’) to 10 (‘Extremely’),  = .87.
Behavior evaluations Participants rated five 
pro-English behaviors involving the use of
English in commercial contexts: demanding
that business correspondence be in English,
not shopping at a store because of monolingual
French signs, avoiding certain stores because of
being rudely treated as an Anglo, responding in
English to a store clerk who addressed you in
French, and openly using English in French
work environments.
Participants’ evaluation of the Anglophone
and Francophone group norms were established
by two questions for each of the five behaviors.
The 11-point items were adapted from Ajzen
(1991) (e.g. ‘How would Francophones/other
Anglophones react to a person who did this
behavior?’; –5 (intensely negatively) to +5
(intensely positively)).1 Scales were created for
Anglophone norm,  = .80, and Francophone
norm,  = .75, by averaging across the five
behaviors.
Cost-benefit evaluations regarding the conse-
quences of the behavior were assessed on
bipolar measures ‘What is the effect of this
behavior on the individual actor?’, from –5
(‘very negative: costs overwhelmingly outweigh
benefits’) to +5 (‘very positive: benefits over-
whelmingly outweigh costs’). Cost-benefit scores
were created by averaging across the five
behaviors,  = .64.
Finally, participants completed a measure of
intentions to engage in each of the five options:
‘When the situation comes up, I react this way
____% of the time’ (0, ‘Never’ to 100, ‘Always’).
By averaging across the five behaviors, a scale
for intentions was created,  = .77.
Results
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), the model
was tested by predicting intentions from norms
(the distal independent variables); predicting
the mediator (cost-benefit evaluations) from
norms; and using the Sobel test to evaluate the
significance of the change in coefficients for
norms when the cost-benefit analyses were
entered in the hierarchical linear regression.
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrela-
tions are presented in Table 1. Two multivariate
outliers identified on the basis of Mahalanobis
distance were deleted.
Group norms predict intentions Anglophone
(ingroup) and Francophone (outgroup) norms
and expectancy-value scores were included as
centered continuous predictors of intentions to
engage in pro-English consumer behaviors (see
Table 2). Group norms were significantly associ-
ated with intentions (adj. R2 = .10, F(2, 193) =
Louis et al. norms and rational conflict
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations (SDs), and intercorrelations for group norms, cost-benefit evaluations,
and intentions
Variables 1 2 3 4
1. Anglophone norm 1.32
(1.42)
2. Francophone norm –.17* –1.71
(1.49)
3. Individual-level cost-benefit evaluation .59*** .17* 0.05
(1.47)
4. Behavioral intention .26*** .17* .41*** 46.00
(26.04)
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
Notes: Uncentered means (SD) in diagonal, and zero-order correlations below. Norms and cost-benefit
evaluations ranged from +5 to –5. Intentions ranged from 0 to 100.
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12.24, p = .000). Perceptions that the behaviors
were more ingroup normative were associated
with higher intentions ( = .30, p = .000; see
Table 2). Independently, higher intentions
were associated with perceptions the behavior
was outgroup normative ( = .22, p = .002).2
Group norms predict cost-benefit evaluations
Group norms were also associated with cost-
benefit analyses: Anglophone and Franco-
phone norms together predicted 42% of the
adjusted variance in consequences for the indi-
vidual (F(2, 195) = 71.98, p = .000). The more
that the ingroup was perceived to support a
behavior, the more the behaviors were thought
to benefit the individual actor ( = .64, p =
.000). Behaviors that the outgroup was per-
ceived to support were also given more positive
cost-benefit evaluations ( = .27, p = .000).
Thus, rather than being independent of social
influence processes, cost-benefit evaluations
could be predicted from group-level norms.
Cost-benefit evaluations mediate the norm-
intention relationships The mediating role of
cost-benefit analyses in ingroup and outgroup
norm-intention relationships was then
examined. When cost-benefit analyses for the
individual actor were entered into the equation
the model fit improved significantly (R2change =
.07, F(1, 192) = 16.49, p = .000) (see Table 2,
block 2). Individuals had stronger intentions to
engage in behaviors that they perceived would
benefit them ( = .30, p = .000). Moreover, the
positive influence of ingroup norms on inten-
tions was fully mediated by individual-level
expectancy-value processes, decreasing from 
 = .30 to  = .08 (z = 3.86, p = .000), as was the
influence of outgroup norms, decreasing from
 = .22 to  = .12 (z = 3.14, p = .001).
Alternative causal models In the current
analyses, the causal path is assumed to flow
from norms to behavior, with cost-benefit
analyses as a mediator. Since the data are cor-
relational, alternative causal paths are possible,
and it is possible that better model fit may be
provided by (for example) assuming that
behavioral intentions drive norm perceptions,
rather than the reverse.3 Table 3 provides fit
statistics from path analyses for the present
model and three alternative theoretical models:
(1) an economic model, in which cost-benefit
analyses drive behavior, with norms as a
mediator; and two reverse path models in
which behavioral intentions drive (2) cost-
benefit analyses with norms as a mediator, or
(3) norms with cost-benefit analyses as a
mediator. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
is especially useful for comparing non-nested
models, with the model with the smallest AIC
being taken as the better fitting. In the present
data, however, all of the measures point in the
same direction: fit statistics (GFI, AGFI) are
higher and error statistics (RMSEA, AIC) are
lower for alternative causal models than for the
present model. Although experimental manip-
ulations and longitudinal data would comp-
lement the present results, the interpretation
that norms are motivating behavior via cost-
benefit analyses is supported by the poorer fit
of alternative and reverse path causal models.
Summary In the present results, ingroup
norms were associated with intentions to
engage in pro-group behaviors (hypothesis 1)
and more favorable cost-benefit evaluations of
the consequences (hypothesis 2). In addition,
the results confirm the hypothesized role of
outgroup norms, which were associated with
intentions (hypothesis 3) and cost-benefit
evaluations (hypothesis 4). Finally, cost-benefit
evaluations were observed to mediate the
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Table 2. Study 1: Prediction of behavioral intentions
as a function of Anglophone and Francophone
group norms and cost-benefit evaluations
Block 1 2
Adj. R2 .10*** .17***
R2 change .11*** .07***
Predictor Standardized coefficients
Anglophone norm .30*** .08***
Francophone norm .22*** .12***
Cost-benefit evaluations .35***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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relationships between norms and intentions
(hypothesis 5), providing evidence that
decision-making at the individual level may be
‘rationally’ informed by distal group-level
factors. 
Discussion
The present results provide support for the
contentions that normative influence can be
deliberative, expectancy-value processes may 
be normative, and that outgroup norms may be
influential in intergroup decision-making.
Specifically, in the present results, Anglophone
support for intergroup behaviors predicted
intentions and cost-benefit calculations, con-
sistent with a social identity model (e.g. Terry &
Hogg, 1996) although inconsistent with a strict
distinction between norms and cost-benefit
analyses (e.g. Azjen, 1991; Klandermans, 1984).
Thus, perceptions of what benefited the actor
were informed by ingroup norms, and these
cost-benefit evaluations mediated the ingroup
norm-intention relationships. In addition,
outgroup norms were associated with more
favorable cost-benefit evaluations of intergroup
behaviors, as well as stronger intentions to
engage in the behaviors. These normative cost-
benefit evaluations mediated the outgroup
norm-intention relationship. Not only ingroup
norms, then, but also outgroup norms, may
influence decisions in intergroup conflict by
guiding strategic expectancy-value processes: a
process of agentic normative influence.
The present study, however, is open to criti-
cism on several methodological grounds.
Importantly, group norms were measured
correlationally for the same common set of
behaviors, leaving the causal path open to
question. Reverse causal models produce worse
fit statistics, in the present results, than a model
whereby norms drive behavior via cost-benefit
analyses. However, it seems likely that the
relationship between norms and cost-benefit
perceptions can be a feedback loop in some
circumstances: where it is difficult to obtain
feedback about other peoples’ views and
actions, benefits to the individual may motivate
intentions and independently motivate partici-
pants to see behaviors as descriptively and pre-
scriptively normative (‘everyone does what I
do’, a false consensus effect: Miller & Prentice,
1994; ‘everyone thinks what’s good for me is
morally right’, a legitimizing myth; Chen &
Tyler, 2001). Conflict contexts, which are char-
acterized by repeated, consequential inter-
actions with ingroup and outgroup members,
may both motivate and inform accurate per-
ceptions of ingroup and outgroup norms,
increasing the effects of perceived norms on
cost-benefit analyses and reducing the feedback
from benefits or costs to norm perceptions
(Louis & Taylor, 2002). However, in the present
study, the two effects are not disentangled. The
independent variables are highly intercorre-
lated (see Table 1), and all participants are
judging the same behaviors as more or less
normative. If indeed there are empirical Anglo-
phone and Francophone norms for the behav-
iors, the variation in norm perceptions implies
(motivated?) inaccuracy in at least some par-
ticipants, inflating the relationships among
measured variables.
Conversely, the power of the study would
have been weakened by the restricted range of
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Table 3. Study 1: Fit statistics for the present theoretical model (1) and three alternative path models
Model Chi-square GFI AGFI RMSEA AIC
1. Norms -> CBA -> Beh 5.46*** .99 .87 .15 23.46
2. CBA -> Norms -> Beh 39.88*** .92 .59 .31 55.88
3. Beh -> CBA -> Norms 26.50*** .94 .81 .20 40.50
4. Beh -> Norms -> CBA 26.17*** .94 .71 .24 42.17
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Note: GFI = goodness-of-fit index; AGFI = adjusted GFI; RMSEA = AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. CBA =
cost-benefit analyses; Beh = behavioral intentions.
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the norm measures, in that all of the behaviors
involved the use of English in commercial/
consumer contexts, and were evaluated by
participants on average as ingroup normative
(M = 1.32) and outgroup antinormative (M =
–1.71; see Table 1). A more powerful analysis
would contrast ingroup and outgroup norma-
tive and antinormative behaviors. Depressed
estimates of the relationship could also have
been produced by the modest reliability for the
critical mediator, cost-benefit evaluations ( =
.64). The total variance accounted for in inten-
tions in the final model was in fact quite low
(adj. R2 = .17; Table 2). Thus, although each of
the predicted norm-evaluation-intention
relationships was significant, a more powerful
test of the model is desirable. In addition,
although the use of English in consumer
contexts is politically controversial and (as the
results suggest) informed by consideration of
intergroup norms and consequences, extension
of the focus to an explicitly political context
may be more compelling to political and inter-
group psychologists. These issues were
addressed in a second study.
Study 2
In Study 2, Anglophone participants generated
and evaluated a range of intergroup behaviors
as a function of an experimental focus on sup-
portive or hostile ingroup and outgroup norms.
Specifically, participants were asked to generate
and evaluate lists of behaviors that Anglo-
phones and Francophones would either
support or oppose. As in Study 1, it was hypoth-
esized that (1) ingroup norms for conflict
behaviors would predict intentions and (2)
expectancy-value processes for the individual
actors; that outgroup norms would also predict
(3) intentions and expectancy-value processes;
and that (4) expectancy-value processes would
mediate the relationship between norms and
intentions, replicating the agentic normative
influence process in which decision-making at
the individual level is ‘rationally’ informed by
distal group-level factors.
Method
Participants As in Study 1, participants were
required to self-identify as Anglophone, and to
be born in Québec or to have lived in the
province for at least 10 years. Of 101 partici-
pants completing the study, 10 were excluded
on these grounds. Ages for the 91 participants
remaining ranged from 18 to 29 with a mean of
20; most were women (n = 70, 78%). Politically,
most of the participants were federalists (n = 76,
84%) with 12 ‘neutral’ participants (13%) and
three ‘undecided’ (3%).
Procedure Forty students participated for
course credit in lower-level psychology courses,
choosing from over 20 available experiments.
The remaining 51 participants were compen-
sated with C$8 for their time; these had been
recruited from undergraduate courses at the
beginning of the term after signing up for a
‘paid psychology subject pool’. During the
45-minute session, participants first completed a
consent form and a ‘demographic information’
questionnaire, in which their identity as Anglo-
phone Québecers was checked. Using stratified
random number table, participants were then
assigned to one of four conditions, Anglophone
norm support/opposition by Francophone
norm support/opposition. Participants com-
pleted the behavior generation task and the
behavioral evaluation measures, were debriefed
verbally, given a written description of the
rationale, and thanked for their participation.
Materials
Anglophone identity Participants first self-
identified as Anglophone (in comparison to
Francophone, or ‘Other’); then, identification
as Anglophones was assessed with a 5-item scale
adapted from Porter (1995). The measures
(e.g. ‘How much do you feel a part of a larger
group/community of people who share this
identity?’) were completed on 11-point scales
from 0 (‘Not at all’) to 10 (‘Extremely’) and
were averaged to form an index of identifi-
cation,  = .73.
Norm manipulation and behavior generations The
study comprised a 2 (Francophone normative/
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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antinormative)  2 (Anglophone normative/
antinormative) between-subject design. Ingroup
or outgroup normative behaviors were defined
as behaviors that most group members approved
of or supported, whereas antinormative behav-
iors were defined as behaviors that most group
members disapproved of or opposed. Partici-
pants read a description of the task which began:
Whenever two groups are in conflict, group
members have to make decisions about how they
are going to act. Sometimes people find actions
that both groups approve of. For example, in a
union–management context, both groups might
agree to have contract negotiations. Sometimes
people use behaviors that one group approves of
and the other disapproves of. For example, a strike
might be called by the union, but disapproved of
by management, whereas strike-breaking might be
something that the union disapproves of, and the
management is promoting. Finally, there are
behaviors that both groups disapprove of. In a
labor context, for example, both groups might
disapprove of property destruction.
When Anglophones and Francophones interact
in Québec, there are many ways that Anglos can try
to advance their own status or that of their group.
We are going to ask you to list behaviors that help
Anglophones advance either their own individual
interests or those of Anglophones as a whole, that
most Francophones and most Anglophones
approve of [that most Francophones and most
Anglophones disapprove of/that most Anglo-
phones approve of, but that most Francophones
disapprove of/that most Anglophones disapprove
of, but that most Francophones approve of].
When the participant signalled to the exper-
imenter that the instructions had been read, a
sheet was provided repeating the information
characterizing the norm condition and the par-
ticipant was given 15 minutes to generate five
behaviors that fit the criteria. 
Behavior evaluations Participants were then
provided with a booklet in which they evaluated
the first three behaviors they had generated. We
did not perform a qualitative analysis per se for
these behaviors, but the modal responses in
each condition could be classified as: violent
acts, pro-Anglophone graffiti/vandalism of
French signs, racist insults (ingroup and out-
group antinormative); assimilation to French at
work, assimilation to French at school, support-
ing separatism (ingroup antinormative, out-
group normative); English at work, English at
school, bilingual signs4 (ingroup normative,
outgroup antinormative); and bilingualism in
education, bilingualism at work, friendliness and
politeness (ingroup and outgroup normative).
Group norms regarding the behaviors were
established by two sets of three questions each
adapted from Ajzen (1991), e.g. ‘How would
Francophones/Anglophones react to a person
who did this behavior?’ Responses were on
11-point Likert type scales ranging from –5
(antinormative) to zero (neutral) to +5 (norma-
tive). Scales were created for Anglophone
norm,  = .96, and Francophone norm,  = .94,
by averaging across the three behaviors.
Individual expectancy-value processes were
assessed with four separate measures of the sub-
jective probability and value of benefits and
costs to the actor. For example, participants
were asked ‘What is the probability that you as
the individual actor will benefit if this behavior
is performed?’ and ‘How important do you
think that the probable costs are, for you as the
individual actor, if this behavior is performed?’.
In each case the scales were unipolar measures,
from 0 (Unimportant/Zero probability) to 10
(Extremely important) or 100 (Certainty).
Weighted bipolar expectancy-value scores were
created by multiplying expectancy and value,
subtracting costs from benefits, and rescaling to
a 21-point scale (from +10, certain and import-
ant benefits only to –10, certain and important
costs only). Expectancy-value scores were
averaged across the behaviors,  = .72.
Two measures of intentions were included,
namely ‘When the situation comes up, what
percent of the time do you react with this
behavior?’ and ‘How likely is it that you would
engage in this behavior?’ (0, ‘Never’ to 100,
‘Always’). These items were averaged for each
behavior, and intentions for the three behaviors
were combined,  = .88.
Results
Manipulation check A 2 Anglophone norm
condition (Support/Opposition)  2 Franco-
phone norm condition (Support/Opposition)
Louis et al. norms and rational conflict
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 2 target group norm (perceived Anglo-
phone/Francophone norm) mixed-model
analysis of variance was performed on rated
group norms for the behaviors. As expected,
interactions were observed between Anglo-
phone norm condition and target group norm
(F(1, 87) = 90.88, p = .000, 2 = .51), and
between Francophone norm condition and
target group norm (F(1, 87) = 127.18, p = .000,
2 = .59), while the three-way interaction was
not significant (F(1, 87) = 1.25, p = .267, 2 =
.01). Post hoc tests revealed that Anglophones
were perceived to evaluate the behaviors gener-
ated in the Anglophone support condition
more favorably (M = 2.52) than in the Anglo-
phone opposition condition (M = –2.11, p =
.000), and Francophones were perceived to
evaluate the behaviors more favorably in the
Francophone support condition (M = 2.23)
than in the Francophone opposition condition
(M = –2.52, p = .000). The manipulated norm
conditions were accordingly used as variables in
subsequent analyses.
Design As in Study 1, hierarchical regression
analyses were conducted on mean behavioral
intentions (the dependent variable), and par-
ticipants’ expectancy-value scores (potential
mediators) to test the hypothesis that ingroup
and outgroup norms would predict cost-benefit
evaluations and intentions, and the cost-benefit
evaluations would mediate the norm-intention
links. Means, standard deviations, and intercor-
relations for the variables are presented in
Table 4. Anglophone (ingroup) and Franco-
phone (outgroup) norm conditions were
entered as dichotomous variables (effect codes)
scored ‘+1’ (support) or ‘–1’ (opposition).5
Continuous expectancy-value scores were
centered, and one outlier was excluded.
Group norms predict intentions Anglophone
and Francophone group norms predicted 42%
of the variance in behavioral intentions (F(2,
87) = 32.94, p = .000). Participants had stronger
intentions to engage in the actions in the Anglo-
phone support condition ( = .60, p = .000; see
Table 5). However, as in Study 1, outgroup
norms predicted intentions independent of the
impact of ingroup norms ( = .28, p = .001).6
Group norms predict expectancy-value scores
Anglophone and Francophone norm manipu-
lations together predicted 31% of the adjusted
variance in rated benefits and costs to the
individual (F(2, 87) = 20.72, p = .000). Ingroup
normative behaviors were thought to benefit
the individual actors ( = 0.41, p = .000), and
independently, outgroup (Francophone) norms
for the behaviors also positively influenced cost-
benefit analyses ( = .40, p = .000). As in Study
1, calculations of the benefits and costs of inter-
group behaviors for the actor were informed by
group-level norms.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
366
Table 4. Means, standard deviations (SDs), and intercorrelations for group norms, cost-benefit 
expectancy-value scores, and intentions
Variables 1 2 3 4
1. Anglophone norm condition 0.04
(1.00)
2. Francophone norm condition –.02 0.00
(1.01)
3. Cost-benefit expectancy-value scores .40*** .39*** 0.19
(3.88)
4. Behavioural intention .59*** .27** .50*** 43.65
(30.21)
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
Notes: Uncentered means (SD) in diagonal, and zero-order correlations below.  Norm conditions: +1 =
support, –1 = oppose.  Cost-benefit scores ranged from +10 (certain, valuable benefits – improbable,
unimportant costs) to –10.  Behavioral intentions ranged from 0 to 100.
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Expectancy-value scores mediate norm-intention
relationships The mediating role of expec-
tancy-value processes in the ingroup and
outgroup norm-intention relationships was then
examined (Table 5, Block 2). When cost-benefit
analyses were entered in a regression equation
along with norm conditions, model fit signifi-
cantly improved (R2change = .03, F(1, 86) = 5.16,
p = .026). Cost-benefit analyses significantly pre-
dicted intentions ( = .22, p = .026). Residual
direct effects of both ingroup and outgroup
norms were observed, when cost-benefit evalu-
ations were entered. However, the expectancy-
value processes had significantly mediated the
effect of both Anglophone ingroup norms on
intentions, which decreased from  = .60 to  =
.51 (z = 2.04, p = .041), and Francophone
outgroup norms, which decreased from  = .28
to  = .19 (z = 2.03, p = .042).
Alternative causal models As for Study 1,
alternative causal models were constructed and
evaluated using standard error of the mean.
Table 6 provides fit statistics from path analyses
for the present model and the same three
alternative theoretical models: cost-benefit
analyses drive behavior, with norms as a
mediator; behavioral intentions drive cost-
benefit analyses with norms as a mediator; or
(3) behavioral intentions drive norms with cost-
benefit analyses as a mediator. In the present
data, as for Study 1, fit statistics (GFI, AGFI) are
higher and error statistics (RMSEA, AIC) are
lower for alternative causal models than for the
present model. Only the present model, in fact,
produces adequate fit and error statistics for
the data, strengthening the interpretation that
norms are motivating behavior via cost-benefit
analyses rather than the reverse/alternative
paths.
Summary These results replicate the correla-
tional relationships observed in Study 1 using a
manipulated focus on supportive or hostile
ingroup and outgroup norms. Ingroup support
predicted intentions to engage in pro-group
behaviors (hypothesis 1) and more favorable
cost-benefit evaluations (hypothesis 2). Out-
group norms were also associated with stronger
intentions (hypothesis 3) and more favorable
cost-benefit evaluations (hypothesis 4). Finally,
expectancy-value scores significantly mediated
the relationships between norms and intentions
(hypothesis 5), although residual direct effects
of norms were also observed.
Discussion
In the present study, as in Study 1, ingroup
norms for conflict behaviors predicted favor-
able cost-benefit perceptions and intentions for
intergroup behaviors. Behaviors that ingroup
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Table 5. Study 2: Prediction of behavioral intentions
as a function of Anglophone and Francophone
norms and cost-benefit expectancy-value scores
Block 1 2
Adj. R2 .42*** .44***
R2 change .43*** .03*
Predictor Standardized coefficients
Anglophone norm .60*** .51***
Francophone norm .28*** .19*
Expectancy-value score .22*
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Table 6. Study 2: Fit statistics for the present theoretical model (1) and three alternative path models
Model Chi-square GFI AGFI RMSEA AIC
1. Norms -> CBA -> Beh 0.04*** 1.00 .99 .00 18.04
2. CBA -> Norms -> Beh 9.34*** .95 .77 .20 25.34
3. Beh -> CBA -> Norms 33.99*** .87 .57 .34 47.99
4. Beh -> Norms -> CBA 10.13*** .95 .74 .21 26.13
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Note: See Table 3 for definitions.
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members supported were seen as more benefi-
cial to the individual actor, and these cost-
benefit analyses significantly mediated the
norm-intention relationships for ingroup
norms. The findings suggest that the impact of
ingroup norms and cost-benefit evaluations are
not necessarily independent, and support a
social identity model in which ingroup norms
can be important in deliberation and strategic
choices (e.g. Abrams, 1994; Terry & Hogg,
1996). However, outgroup norms also influ-
enced cost-benefit analyses, in the present
study. Conformity to outgroup norms regard-
ing ingroup members’ conflict choices was
seen as beneficial, and the influence of
outgroup norms on intentions was significantly
mediated by evaluations. Thus, outgroup
norms predicted the perceived benefits of the
behaviors, which in turn predicted intentions
to engage in conflict choices. The present
study illustrates a process that we call agentic
normative influence in which both ingroup and
outgroup norms inform deliberation for inter-
group behaviors.
Regarding the relative strength of the medi-
ation of cost-benefit evaluations in Studies 1
(full) and 2 (partial): it may be the case that
the intergroup context was more salient in
Study 2 than with the consumer choices of
Study 1, triggering processes in which group-
level variables motivate intentions indepen-
dently from cost-benefit evaluations at the
individual level (see also, Kelly, 1993; Louis
et al., 2005; Klandermans, 1984; Simon et al.,
1998). The contingencies that govern the
relative importance of agentic normative
influence, as mediated by rational cost-benefit
calculations, versus other processes of referent
or subjective normative influence, seem likely
to be a fruitful topic of future research. For the
purposes of this paper, however, the results of
Study 2 are important in that they provide a
replication of the agentic normative influence
process: in intergroup decision-making, both
ingroup and outgroup norms predicted inten-
tions and the evaluation of costs and benefits,
and the norm-intention relationships were sig-
nificantly mediated by these expectancy-value
processes.
Limitations It was a goal of Study 2 to provide
a stronger test of the agentic model by using a
manipulation of focus on supportive or hostile
group norms and by accessing a wider range of
behavior. Study 1 analyzed correlational vari-
ation in norms, cost-benefit analyses, and
intentions among a common set of behaviors
(which were perceived to be ingroup normative/
outgroup anti-normative). However, in Study 2,
participants first generated and then evaluated
behaviors as a function of ingroup and outgroup
approval or disapproval. The norm manipula-
tions successfully induced participants to focus
on qualitatively different behaviors—e.g. racist
insults vs. bilingualism at work—and it was the
randomly assigned norm condition, rather than
measured norm perceptions, that was observed
in Study 2 to influence intentions both directly
and via cost-benefit perceptions. These effects
are consistent with a causal role for normative
influence, and this interpretation is strength-
ened by consideration of alternative path
models, as described above. Nevertheless, a
more stringent test would manipulate group
norms for particular behaviors and demonstrate
subsequent changing cost-benefit perceptions
and effects on intentions. Moreover, when par-
ticipants evaluated the costs and benefits of the
behavior for the individual actor, benefits such
as the satisfaction of affiliation needs were not
ruled out explicitly. Indeed, order effects may
have focused respondents’ attention on social
outcomes for the behaviors, where the norm
measures or manipulation preceded measure-
ment of cost-benefit perceptions. A better
design would include counterbalanced measures
of expressive motivation and agentic motivation
and explicitly assess the mediation of ingroup
norms and outgroup norms by each. Future
research may thus provide a test of agentic
normative influence by using longitudinal
research to assess the effects of changing norm
perceptions on subsequent expectancy-value
processes, intentions, and behavior in the field.
General discussion
In two studies, ingroup and outgroup norms for
conflict behaviors were positively related to
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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cost-benefit perceptions and intentions for
intergroup behaviors. Behaviors that were sup-
ported by the outgroup or the ingroup were
seen as beneficial for the individual actor, and
were more likely to be endorsed by participants.
Moreover, the cost-benefit analyses significantly
mediated the norm-intention relationships for
both ingroup and outgroup norms. This was
true when norms were assessed for the same
behaviors, in Study 1, and across behaviors, in
Study 2. Thus, for Anglophones considering
behaviors relevant to intergroup conflict in
Québec, Anglophone and Francophone norms
are observed to predict rather than suppress
rational processes (see also, Mackie et al.,
1992).
Two aspects of these results are of theoretical
importance. First, the present studies articulate
a process whereby group norms in conflict
decision-making direct deliberative expectancy-
value processes, rather than operating in
parallel or in conflict. It should be reiterated
that in many contexts, group members may well
have motives for conformity to ingroup norms
that are independent of cost-benefit calcula-
tions. For example, fans can wear team colors
to fulfill a need for approval, or to affirm or
express a valued identity. Where there are no
tactical issues of eliciting desired outgroup
responses in ongoing interaction, conformity
may be exclusively to ingroup norms and moti-
vated primarily by expressive needs. Thus,
many motives to conform may operate in
parallel to cost-benefit calculations (as indeed is
suggested by residual group norm effects in
Study 2; but see also Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975; in politics, Kelly, 1993; Klander-
mans, 1984; Simon et al., 1998). However, for
many choices in intergroup conflict, norms for
groups in conflict may also influence decision-
making because they define the means to
acquire benefits and to avoid costs. In two
studies in the context of English–French
relations in Québec, this was apparently the
case. Mediational analyses of agentic normative
influence processes in other intergroup con-
flicts may allow the role of group norms in cost-
benefit analyses to be better understood
and/or predicted.
A second aspect of the present results of
theoretical interest is evidence of an indepen-
dent role of outgroup norms in decision-
making for intergroup behavior. A range of
research and theory in intergroup relations
suggests that outgroup norms are often irrele-
vant to individuals’ decision-making (e.g. Terry
& Hogg, 1996; Turner et al., 1989). However,
because outgroups’ motivations and reactions
are targeted in conflict behaviors, salient
outgroup norms may motivate deliberate con-
formity or violation even when ingroup identi-
ties are salient. In the present study, outgroup
norms independently predicted intentions, and
influenced the cost-benefit calculations of
ingroup members. Allowing ingroup and
outgroup norms to be included in conflict
decision-making models may also improve the
predictive or explanatory power of intergroup
theories.
In both studies, Anglophones perceived con-
formity to outgroup norms to be beneficial, but
the positive relationship of conformity with
outgroup norms and group-level expectancy-
value processes needs to hold across time or
intergroup contexts (see also, Louis & Taylor,
2002; Louis et al., 2005). Future research is
required to specify when outgroup norms are
considered irrelevant, versus motivating strate-
gic conformity versus strategic norm violation.
We may offer several predictions on that score,
however. First, when a ‘societal’ consensus
exists, outgroup norms may add nothing to the
prediction of behavior once ingroup norms are
controlled. For example, if both the ingroup
and outgroup favor individuals’ voting rather
than rioting, outgroup norms are statistically
redundant when ingroup norms are controlled.
Moreover, where no conflict exists, there is no
reason to consider behavioral alternatives and
thus no reason to deliberate. Implicitly, a super-
ordinate category and norm govern the
behavior via referent informational influence.
However, when real differences in group
norms exist, the salience of alternatives may
engage deliberative processing. Strategic con-
formity to outgroup norms may be motivated by
desires to signal common values, a common
superordinate identity, or common goals;
Louis et al. norms and rational conflict
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strategic violation may be motivated by attempts
to increase the costs of inaction for the
outgroup. In the present study, conformity with
outgroup Francophone norms was seen as ben-
efiting the group, but future research is needed
to tease apart the specific rationales that were
important.
Relative group power seems likely to be a
factor moderating the relationship between
group norms and choices for conformity or
norm violation. Research in escalating inter-
group violence suggests that perceptions of
outgroup power may motivate norm violation
because of stronger threat perceptions (e.g.
Staub, 2001); however, research in discrimi-
nation suggests that threatening outgroup
power may sometimes produce appeasement
(Ng, 1982). We might predict that low relative
power creates stronger contingencies for
outgroup norms both for norm violation (the
motivation for defiance) and conformity (the
costs of defiance). Similarly, low relative power
would presumably weaken both positive and
negative contingencies for ingroup norms.
Further research may test these hypotheses
empirically by manipulating power positions in
ad hoc groups, or by measuring the moderating
effects of power perceptions on norm-evalu-
ation relationships for real groups such as
Anglophones and Francophones.
Finally, outgroup norms may drive attitudes
and behavior unstrategically when ingroup
members ostentatiously reject the outgroup
influence: a phenomenon called ‘reactance’
(e.g. Brehm, 1966), or ‘anticonformity’ (Nail,
MacDonald, & Levy, 2000). Some research on
stigmatized minorities suggests that defensive
rejection of outgroup norms should be con-
sidered in addition to, or even instead of,
positive conformity to the ingroup (e.g.
Falomir, Mugny, & Pérez, 2000; in social
movement research, e.g. Gurr, 1970; Kaplan
& Liu, 2000). However, reactance appears to
involve an esteem-motivated rejection of the
outgroup identity and we speculate that it does
not implicate cost-benefit calculations, whereas
strategic norm violation in the agentic model
would be motivated by expected beneficial
consequences to the ingroup and self.
In conclusion, the present studies draw on
the larger literature that deals with the dynamic
of action and reaction in intergroup conflict.
Ingroup and outgroup norms for intergroup
behaviors predict cost-benefit analyses that are
proposed to mediate the relationship between
norms and intentions to engage in conflict
choices. The agentic normative influence process
seems likely to occur commonly in the decision-
making of group members in intergroup
conflict. Assessment of this process may play a
part in understanding the psychological pro-
cesses that translate dynamics of intergroup
action and reaction into individuals’ choices
among intergroup behaviors. Moreover,
analysis of agentic influence processes suggests
one means by which ‘rational’ decision-making
is consistent with, and informed by, group-level
social influence. In modeling the relationship
between cost-benefit analyses and ingroup and
outgroup norms, intergroup researchers may
begin to address two theoretically and socially
important questions: ‘How does group identity
influence “rational” decision-making?’ and
‘How do individuals in intergroup conflict
choose among inaction, conciliation, and con-
frontation?’
Notes
1. Thus, as noted in the introduction, the group
norms here are not descriptive (whether
Anglophones and Francophones would behave
this way themselves) but rather injunctive and
relational (whether Anglophone and
Francophone groups approve of the target’s
behavior). Just as with interpersonal sources (see
Ajzen, 1991), ingroup and outgroup members
may react positively to behaviors that they are not
likely to do themselves, and vice versa. 
2. The impact of ingroup norms was not moderated
by outgroup norms. Inclusion of the interaction
did not increase model fit (R2change = .00, 
F(1, 192) = 2.64, p = .106), nor was the interaction
term significant. Alternative models might
include identification as an independent
predictor (e.g. Kelly, 1993) or as a moderator of
the effects of ingroup norms (e.g. Turner et al.,
1989) or cost-benefit perceptions (e.g. Terry &
Hogg, 1996) on intentions. However, these
variables do not increase model fit when group
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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norms and cost-benefit perceptions are
controlled (F(3, 189) = 0.57, p = .637), nor are
any coefficients significant (id = .06, p = .394;
idxnorm = .09, p = .290; idxcba = –.07, p = .771).
3. We thank anonymous reviewers for this
suggestion. For a discussion of measures of model
fit in structural equation modeling, see e.g. Hu
and Bentler (1995). The results in Table 3 suggest
that although the alternative models tested are
much worse than the present model, it itself has
larger than desirable error measures and smaller
than desirable adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI).
Modification indices suggest that the fit would
improve to acceptable levels if ingroup and
outgroup norm measures were correlated, not
modeled as independent. This intercorrelation is
also apparent in Table 1, as noted in the
discussion.
4. Québec legislation mandated that French
predominate on commercial signs and thus
bilingual signs in Québec can be subject to fines
in some conditions (see Chevrier, 1997). 
5. Effect codes (1/–1) and dummy codes (1/0) for
categorical variables generate the same R2
change. However, Aiken and West (1991) suggest
that where there are two or more categorical
variables that may interact, effect coding is
preferable because dummy variables produce
correlated contrast vectors for the two ‘main
effects’ and the interaction, whereas with equal 
n effect codes do not. As in Study 1, however, the
interaction of the variables was not significant:
the inclusion of the interaction term did not
increase the fit of the model (R2change = .02, F(3,
82) = 0.93, p = .430), nor was the coefficient
significant. 
6. As in Study 1, alternative models with
identification as an independent predictor, as a
moderator of the effects of ingroup norms and of
cost-benefit perceptions on intentions were also
considered. Even when group norms and
cost-benefit perceptions were controlled, the
entry of identification and the interaction terms
increased model fit (F(3, 83) = 4.04, p = .010).
Analysis of the coefficients suggested that
participants higher in identification were more
likely to engage in the conflict behaviors in all
conditions (id = .23, p = .003). As in Study 1,
however, strongly identified respondents were not
more responsive to ingroup norms (idxnorm = .11,
p = .312) or less influenced by cost-benefit
calculations (idxcba = .04, p = .410). It should be
noted that weak effects of identification, in both
Studies 1 and 2, may have occurred because the
identification measures preceded the norm
measures or manipulations. As participants
subsequently evaluated pro-group behaviors
and/or explicitly considered conflicting norms
for conflict behavior, the salience of the identity
may have changed through the course of the
study. Ingroup identity salience and identification
have been robustly linked to greater conformity
to ingroup norms in previous theory and research
(e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996). Thus, although it is
not a focus of the present paper, it would be
surprising if moderating effects were not
observed with a more powerful test, such as 
re-running the analyses with post-measures of
identity salience. 
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